Can Nauthera replace Keycloak?
For OpenID Connect apps that map roles by email: passkeys, MFA, LDAP and GitHub sign-in, organizations, audit. It is pre-1.0, in a design-partner program, without SAML, SCIM or user import.
What it has: an OAuth 2.0 and OpenID Connect provider whose organizations are each their own issuer, hosted sign-in pages, an admin dashboard and API, and a hash-chained audit log. Users sign in with a password or, where allowed, a passkey alone; through an external OpenID Connect provider or GitHub; or with an LDAP or Active Directory password. The second factor is TOTP, a passkey or, where an operator opts in, an emailed code.
Nauthera is pre-1.0, in a design-partner program: its signed server and operator images and its Helm chart are public on the GitHub Container Registry, and teams can apply for one of five design-partner seats to pilot it with direct support. The source is private. It does not serve SAML, SCIM provisioning, user import or token exchange (RFC 8693); users sign in through OpenID Connect providers, GitHub, LDAP or Active Directory, or with an account of its own. Keycloak vs Nauthera says when Keycloak is the better choice today.
Passwords cannot be imported as hashes, and tokens carry scopes and Nauthera's own admin roles, not the old provider's groups, so moving users means invitations, password resets or federation. Migration walks through it one application at a time.
Keycloak can stay where it is: Nauthera can sit between your applications and an existing OpenID Connect provider, as their issuer. That provider's discovery document, token endpoint and keys must be on public addresses: the server refuses private ones, and an HTTPS_PROXY on a private address too.
Keycloak's operator manages clients as custom resources too, a preview since Keycloak 26.8.0, with a secret you supply (Managing clients). In Nauthera the OIDCClient resource is the main interface: the server generates the secret and the operator writes it into a Kubernetes Secret.